Daily Report

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Prosecutor on Arrests of Greek Minority Members

AU2605204694 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 26 May 94

[Interview with Prosecutor General Alush Dragoshi by Reis Cico in Tirana; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Cico] Mr. Prosecutor, the Greek mass media and government officials have declared that more than 30 minority members have been arrested in the south of Albania. What is your comment on these statements?

[Dragoshi] As is made known to the entire public through the Albanian mass media, some time ago the Tirana District Prosecutor's Office initiated criminal proceedings against five [as heard] minority members in the districts of Delvine, Sarande, and Gjirokaster, who are charged with ordinary and political crimes, such as the illegal keeping of arms and anti-constitutional activities. As the social danger of these criminal acts is very accentuated, we have arrested them.

The investigators charged to inquire into these cases have been sent to the respective districts to carry out the investigation of criminal cases and interrogate witnesses. More specifically, these investigators have summoned 30 or more witnesses to clarify these cases. That is, the fact of summoning these witnesses does not mean that they were apprehended or arrested by the Prosecutor's Office. They are summoned only to be interrogated as witnesses and to clarify charges against the persons arrested. The announcement on the arrest of these persons, broadcast by various mass media and the Greek Government officials, is not at all true. I, once again, declare publicly that this fact is not true. [as heard]

[Cico] How many arrested persons are there?

[Dragoshi] The number of the arrested persons, as I mentioned previously, is only six. They are now being investigated while under arrest. To inquire into their case, we will question witnesses, consider documentary evidence, and compile expert reports, as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Berov Cabinet Receives Vote of Confidence

AU2605190694 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1724 GMT 26 May 94

[Excerpts] National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov is already at the National Assembly rostrum and Prime Minister Lyuben Berov is in the Assembly hall. Everything is ready for the official announcement.

[Yordanov] I call upon Mr. Kiril Zhelev to announce the results of the voting on the confidence motion in the cabinet of Lyuben Berov.

[Zhelev] A secret vote took place today at the request of the Council of Ministers to receive a vote of confidence. [passage omitted] Some 221 National Assembly deputies voted. Some 125 cast their ballots in support of the confidence motion, with 95 against. One National Assembly member cast an empty vote. There were no invalid ballots. On the basis of the results, the National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria, based on Article 112, Paragraph 1 of the Bulgarian Constitution and in connection with Article 83, Paragraph 4 of the Regulations on National Assembly Activity, has decided to grant confidence in the government in connection with its Program of Intent Until September 1994.

[Yordanov] Mr. Prime Minister, you may take the floor.

[Berov] Esteemed Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, and People's Representatives: It is usually customary on such occasions to express gratitude. However, I think that even those who, because of various reasons, oppose me would hardly envy me for the task that has been bestowed on me for the next three and a half months. This task is to steer the ship on which all of us are traveling through troubled voters, near dangerous rocks, and toward some safe port. This is a difficult task and this is a contradictory country. I promise to make every effort to implement my task and steer the ship toward a safe port. Thank you. [applause, jeers]

[Yordanov] Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister. I now hand the floor over to Mr. Vasil Gotsev, who will speak on behalf of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] parliamentary faction.

[Gotsev] Esteemed Mr. Chairman, esteemed ladies and gentlemen, People's Representatives, and Mr. Professor Berov, who, after everything that has happened, I cannot calmly call Mr. Prime Minister:

We have witnessed another parliamentary farce, which took place in this hall last week. [passage omitted] After being supported by only 25 members of the National Assembly in last week's no-confidence motion proposed by the SDS, the prime minister failed to do what a prime minister should do in every democratic state where the parliament and the Constitution are respected—resign. [passage omitted] Instead of doing this—devoid of any political and human dignity, pardon the expression—this prime minister forced us to vote confidence in connection with this government's plans until September 1994. [passage omitted]

Only 25 deputies gave you their vote of confidence last week. This means you did not receive a vote of confidence for what you have done so far. Why then did you ask for a vote of confidence until September? What parliament prolonged the life of this disgraceful cabinet by giving it their confidence?

Indeed, what actually took place today behind closed doors—on the one hand, at the meeting of the Bulgarian Socialist Party faction, where long discussions were held and where prudent people certainly said that we must proceed toward early parliamentary elections and, on then other hand, in your room, Mr. Dogan? You implemented the instructions of the ambassador of a foreign state, the very same state that under the name of the USSR dictated everything that took place in our country. Today you obeyed the orders of [Russian] Ambassador Avdeyev. This shows the civilized world your true colors.

Ladies and gentlemen and people's representatives, we are witnessing the agony of our state, not just the agony of this government. All of you who supported a prime minister that disregarded the Constitution, the principles of parliamentarianism, and the interests of the Bulgarian people contributed to this agony. However, despite your desire to rule until the end of your life at the early elections, the Bulgarian people will cast their votes for those who today did not support you. [applause]

[Yordanov] Thank you, Mr. Gotsev. I close the session. The next session will take place tomorrow at 0900.

Indian President Arrives, Meets With Zhelev

BK2705060394 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 0245 GMT 27 May 94

[Text] India and Bulgaria have signed six agreements for promoting cooperation in various fields. The agreements were signed in Sofia yesterday on the first day of the state visit of the president, Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharma, to Bulgaria. An important agreement signed by the two countries relates to cooperation in combating international terrorism and illegal trafficking in narcotic drugs. The home minister, Mr. S.B. Chavan, signed the agreement on behalf of India. The other agreements relate to cooperation in tourism, avoidance of double taxation and for cooperation in plant protection measures and in veterinary and sanitation areas. Earlier, the president, Dr. Sharma, had talks with the Bulgarian president, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev. The talks later continued at delegation levels.

The Bulgarian president supported India's stand on Kashmir and urged New Delhi and Islamabad to resolve the issue through bilateral talks under the Simla Agreement. An official spokesman said Dr. Sharma appreciated Bulgaria's consistent support to issues of concern to

India. The two leaders also discussed bilateral issues and matters of regional importance.

Speaking at a banquet hosted in his honor by the Bulgarian president, Dr. Sharma underlined the need for closer economic cooperation between the two countries. He said the changes which have taken place in both the countries have opened up fresh avenues of cooperation and urged entrepreneurs to take full advantage of the emerging markets. He said the Indo-Bulgarian friendship is motivated by the desire to work for a peaceful world and harmonious humanity.

Payne Opposes Russian NATO Proposals

LD2605172194 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] If NATO remains faithful to its original ideas in the Partnership for Peace program, it will not accede to Russian demands, said Jiri Payne, chairman of the parliament's foreign affairs committee, in reaction to Russian demands that the Partnership for Peace agreement be accompanied by a treaty guaranteeing a system of consultation between Russia and NATO. Payne described as rather shocking the notion that Russia should take part in decisions concerning the expansion of NATO to include Central and Eastern Europe.

Havel Interviewed Before Visit to Slovakia

LD2505171194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 25 May 94

[Excerpts] Czech President Vaclav Havel will visit Bratislava on 26 May as one of three meetings that he and Slovak President Michal Kovac have agreed to hold annually. Before his visit he gave an interview to Slovak Radio Prague correspondent Daniela Galikova.

[Begin recording] [Galikova] Do you think there has been a qualitative shift in Czech-Slovak relations since the split of the Czechoslovak Federation?

[Havel] Shortly after the split some problems were very sensitive, burning, and painful. Much was written about them, and excessive emphasis was placed on their political aspect. My view is that they have probably been transformed into more matter-of-fact issues. [passage omitted]

[Galikova] The new Slovak cabinet has been in office for over a month now. It is generally being perceived as the cabinet that has contributed to calming down the Slovak political scene. Do you think that now is the right time to discuss the issues pertaining to Czech-Slovak relations that remain unsolved, especially considering (?very tense relations) with the current Slovak opposition?

[Havel] My view is that we are not in a hurry. It would be damaging if any hurried solution to those issues that remain open were to interfere with the pre-election situation in Slovakia or cause any unnecessary polarization. For various reasons I do not think that it would be a good thing if something that might be called the Czech card were to play a role in the Slovak elections. This would not be good. That is why I think it is better to work calmly and to make certain preparations. Once agreements are ripe for being concluded, we can conclude them. However, taking the elections into account, I do not think it would be good to hurry anything. [end recording]

Report on Havel-Kovac Talks in Bratislava

LD2605172394 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] With the latest interim results of talks between Czech and Slovak Presidents Vaclav Havel and Michal Kovac in Bratislava, here is Eva Hulkova.

[Begin recording] According to Czech presidential spokesman Ladislav Spacek, President Havel stressed that the foreign policy orientation of both countries is very similar, and in some respects identical.

Unresolved issues between the two countries have, in the eyes of both sides, ceased to be political and have become the subject of negotiations between experts. Of 12 agreements expected to be signed, eight have been signed already. President Kovac expressed the hope that the process of concluding the agreements might be completed by the end of the year. The Czech Republic praised the fact that the Slovak Republic had agreed to a standard form of border controls, and the formal signing of a treaty to that effect is equally in sight.

The presidents stated that the fall in trade between the two countries constituted a certain weakening of mutual relations. According to President Kovac, administrative standardization in both countries and the process of transformation, whereby the state has fewer possibilities of intervention, are throwing up barriers in the culture and education spheres. The decline in cultural and educational exchange activity could be compensated for by nongovernment-sponsored arrangements. President Havel proposed in this context the setting up of an Institute of Czecho-Slovak Studies. [end recording]

Havel Adviser Interviewed on Stability Conference

BR2605151794 Paris LE FIGARO in French 26 May 94 p 4

[Interview with Prince Karl Schwarzenberg, chief of Czech President Havel's cabinet, by Xavier Gautier; place and date not given: "The 'Good Intentions' of the Balladur Plan"]

[Text]*Karl Schwarzenberg, chief of President Vaclav Havel's personal cabinet since 1989 and heir to a long line of Austro- Hungarian prince-diplomats, remains, one year after the partitioning of Czechoslovakia, the closest adviser to the father of the "Velvet Revolution." Now living in Prague, this Vienna-educated prince is one of the most committed spokesmen voicing the hopes and frustrations of central Europe with regard to Brussels' partial opening-up to the new democracies.*

[Gautier] What are your views on the Conference on Stability that opens today in Paris and will attempt to solve the problems of good-neighborliness between the countries of central Europe?

[Schwarzenberg] Can you imagine a roundtable organized in Biscay, in the French Basque country, organized

so that France, Spain, Ireland, and Britain could discuss the Basque and Irish problems under the benevolent supervision of the Czechs and the Americans? No? Neither can I.

[Gautier] But does not the "Balladur plan" provide the new democracies with a forum to talk about their problems?

[Schwarzenberg] All this reminds me of the story concerning my great grandfather, a very wise man who lived in the last century. One day he was introduced to some very pretty girls with the aim of getting him to marry one of them. "She is superb," he said, "she will be perfect for my best friend." Well, Mr. Balladur's plan is doubtless superb, but it is solely suited to his best friend.

[Gautier] Seen from Prague, does the conference appear destined to fail?

[Schwarzenberg] Let me return to my hypothetical "Biscay" roundtable. If it were a roundtable, we would have had to prepare for the Conference on Stability in Europe to get down to some long- term work, especially since by exposing our intimate problems for all the world to see, we risk opening a new Pandora's box. The founding fathers of the "stability pact" do not have solid experience of the problems in our part of Europe.

[Gautier] France and its European neighbors have not, however, spared any efforts to understand the situation in central Europe.

[Schwarzenberg] Karl Kraus, the Austrian author of "Last Days of Humanity," once wrote: "Good intentions are the opposite of good politics." (Footnote 1) (Karl Kraus was one of the journalists most feared by the Austro-Hungarian government early in this century.)

I think that the conference was put together by bureaucrats who had plenty of good intentions, but whose spirit was too Cartesian. The Europeans will soon run up against prejudices which are deeply rooted in the spirits of their interlocutors. In our part of the world, resentment goes way back in history.

[Gautier] In this connection, the Czech Republic, the United States, and even Moscow have been asked to play a mediating role at this conference. Is that not the beginning of a good idea?

[Schwarzenberg] In a pinch, the Baltic problem could be compared to the Basque problem. However, if the Russian federation sits down at the negotiating table as a mediator—and what other role could it play?—then it will run into opposition from the Baltic countries, which is understandable.

[Gautier] Is your pessimism not out of place when one observes the way in which Europe successfully offered a status to South Tyrol, which is disputed by Austria and Italy?

[Schwarzenberg] Of course, but the issue of South Tyrol was limited. It demanded the commitment of two neighbors, both members of the European Community [as published].

[Gautier] What do you think the chances are of saving the Paris Conference?

[Schwarzenberg] The kind of problem the conference is studying cannot be resolved with great pomp. France cites the example of the Madrid conference on the Middle East, but Madrid did not yield anything. Only the Oslo negotiations, which were held in secret and spread out over two years, resulted in the agreements on Jericho and Gaza.

[Gautier] Speaking of your Slovak neighbor, the problem of the Hungarian minority seemed like a riddle a month ago. Yet, Jozef Moravcik, the new prime minister, has just submitted a bill protecting minority rights, without the help of the Europeans. What does Prague think about that?

[Schwarzenberg] The new government in Bratislava has, thank God, taken the exact opposite course of its predecessor's policies. It has decided to tackle the problems of minorities in a pragmatic way. The Slovak Government now needs support not just from its neighbors, but from Europe as a whole.

Havel Comments on Visit by Chile's Pinochet

LD2605202594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 26 May 94

[Excerpts] Czech President Havel is on a one-day visit to Slovakia today. [passage omitted] Commenting on the forthcoming visit by Chilean General Pinochet to the Czech Republic, Havel said: We wish to have good relations with Chile. It is a developed industrial country. However, I am not very happy about the fact that the person coming to Prague is the representative of the Chilean arms industry—Gen. Pinochet. I did not invite him, he was invited by a private company. [passage omitted]

Newspaper Publishes Sudeten German Days Documents

AU2605125194 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 21 May 94 p 7

["Text" of Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock's speech at the Sudeten German Days in Nuremberg, date not given; statement made by Czech President Vaclav Havel after his visit to Austria on 29 March; and the "texts" of the invitations sent to Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and Chairman of the Czech Social Democratic Party Milos Zeman to take part in the Sudeten German Days, dates not given: "Subject: The Sudeten German Days 21-22 May 1994"]

[Text]*Speech by Austrian Foreign Minister Dr. Alois Mock for the Sudeten German Days in Nuremberg and*

published in the weekly SUDETENDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: "Open to the Demands of the Ethnic Minorities"

In my capacity as Austrian foreign minister, I greet most cordially all the participants in the 45th Sudeten German Days! I do so not only in view of our common Austrian past, but also in appreciation of just how substantially the 160,000 Sudeten Germans who found a new home in Austria after 1945, and their descendants, have contributed to our country's recovery.

The Sudeten Germans' view of history still continues to be clouded by memories of the iniquities suffered. In my opinion, we must—in this very issue—take seriously the obligation that we should come to terms honorably with the past, because respect for the tens of thousands of innocent victims of the expulsions enjoins us to do so.

In this connection, I am reminded of the great words of the first Austrian federal chancellor after 1945, Leopold Figl, who in his time suffered in Nazi concentration camps, but, despite this, said: "Let us not forget, but let us forgive!"

I know that this point of view is also shared by the Sudeten Germans. The "Charter of German Expellees" from 1950 contains the following poignant sentences:

"We expelled Germans renounce revenge and retaliation. This binding decision is sacred to us given the memory of the infinite suffering that the last decade in particular (that is, the period from 1940 to 1950) has brought to mankind."

During the period when the aforementioned charter was formulated, we could still hope that Europe was finally beginning another chapter in its history. Today we are witnesses to how our continent is again afflicted with the crime of mass resettlement.

Few people have expressed the association between the fate of the Sudeten Germans and some current events so clearly and pointedly as Czech President Vaclav Havel, who, as we know, feels that everyone who approves of the resettlement of the German ethnic minority also in fact approves of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In any case, I am convinced that it would be disastrous if Europe were again to make the same mistakes as it did in 1945.

In short, we must not let brute force gain ground unlawfully in Europe again. We must not let someone—for the second time in less than 50 years in Europe—in the services of the cynical policy of "ethnic cleansing" commit acts that cannot be prevented without, at the same time, leading to new acts of injustice.

Moreover, we must—with a thought for the fate of the Sudeten Germans and the current events in southeastern Europe—strive unconditionally to define functioning European national and minority rights.

Austrian foreign policy—like the expellees' unions—has long been striving for this.

Therefore, we ascribe extraordinary importance to the decision made at the Vienna meeting involving the presidents and prime ministers of the Council of Europe member countries, a decision whereby the protection of minorities is to become the subject of an appropriate general convention and of a supplementary protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.

After 1945, the Sudeten Germans had to establish a completely new existence. They have done so in a remarkable manner.

In the majority of cases, however, they had probably already given up hope of renewing contacts with their old homeland. Thanks to the Iron Curtain and communist dictatorship, the past seemed to be irrevocable.

It is absolutely understandable that today, when the Czech Republic and Slovakia are again embarking on a road toward democracy, a law-governed state, and respect for human rights, the Sudeten Germans are asking whether the moment has also not come when a new chapter in the history of relations with their former homeland could be opened.

I—at least—have resolved that I will use every suitable opportunity to bring the demands of the Sudeten Germans to the attention of our Czech and Slovak partners and that I will emphasize our interest in ensuring that this issue is resolved with a view to the future and in the spirit of good neighborly relations.

In particular, I feel that it could be possible for the Sudeten Germans to become involved to a greater extent in the endeavors to develop the Czech Republic and Slovakia economically.

As the first precedential cases have indicated, the Sudeten Germans are well prepared for economic activity in their former homeland. From a general point of view, these people—thanks to their intensely close ties to the country—would probably often be more willing to mobilize local resources than other foreign investors (oriented, exclusively, toward profit).

The time is probably not yet ripe for more comprehensive plans of this nature.

Despite that, I will continue to orient my efforts in that direction. I will do so because I consider Austria's relations with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and our other Danubian neighbors to be—especially under the new conditions—an important point of our foreign policy.

With respect to those countries, we now have the opportunity to implement extensive practical cooperation. Not only between governments, parliaments, local representative offices, professional organizations, special-interest groups, and political parties, but also internationally, on

foreign and defense policy as well as the economy, culture, and environmental protection.

I am convinced that the Sudeten Germans can help to implement such a policy.

I am also expressing this desire because I know what genuinely unequivocal Europeans the expellees have become thanks to their tragic fate.

The expellees' charter contained the following in August 1950: "We will support every effort oriented toward creating a united Europe in which all peoples can live freely and without fear."

Austria is now standing on the threshold of a united Europe. If on 12 June the Austrian people decide in favor of our country's membership of the European Union, Austria will be able to take an active role in creating this the most significant practical peaceful achievement in European history.

We will be able to take part in building a peaceful Europe, a Europe full of increasing mutuality. We will do this, because a united Europe represents the best guarantee that the terrible fate visited on the Sudeten Germans in 1945 will never be repeated under its roof. *Statement Made by President Vaclav Havel Following his Return From a State Visit to Austria on 29 March 1993*

We are building a new democratic and law-governed state; we are building a civic society. This state cannot be founded on heresies, lies, or prejudices; this could regress tragically upon us. The issue for me involves the cleanliness of our political maturity. The ability to look our own past in the face is also part of this.

The forced evacuation of millions of people, based on a purely national principle—that is, on the principle of collective guilt—is a morally defective act. Approving of it means indirectly approving of the forced evacuation of Jews, Tatars, Lithuanians, and other peoples from their homes; it also means approving of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. It is impossible to build a civic society on the endorsement of such dangerous national acts. Just as national self-awareness cannot be founded on forged manuscripts, it cannot be founded on any other national prejudice. It is even necessary to say far more unpleasant things about ourselves: For example, that, during the First Republic, we did not manage to resolve the issue of the minorities satisfactorily; that Slovakia was not always treated well; that our resistance fighters did not enjoy too much support among the public either during the war or under communism, and people preferred to steer clear of them; that the major part of the public voted for the communists; that we allowed the suffering of the Jews to be kept quiet; that many Czechs did not stand up for them during the war; and that, after the Munich diktat, many Czechs and Czech organizations descended into the most shameful anti-Semitism.

We are no worse than others; but we are no better. In my opinion, it is the duty of a president to point out these unpopular things. We are obliged to tell the truth about ourselves, first and foremost, for our own sakes and that of our descendants. It is surely possible to discuss, at the appropriate level, the evacuation of the Sudeten Germans, but it is even more important for us to discuss it without prejudice among ourselves. I have spoken about this many times and always here, at home. I remember the visit of President Weizsaecker and his speech in the Vladislav Hall. However, if I am asked abroad for my opinion, I give the same answer there as at home, for I am not schizophrenic, saying one thing abroad and another here.

Of course, I did not go to Austria so that I could discuss this issue there, but, at the same time, I did not go there to avoid unpleasant questions. Incidentally, in my statements, the moral condemnation of the evacuation was completely in the shade of my interpretation of why the legal aspect of this issue is closed and unchangeable for us and why no legal consequences can arise from a moral judgment. I think that I explained this more thoroughly than many of my critics here.

The fact that my critics condemned my statements without knowing them testifies to the very weak political culture in our country. Understandably, the Office of the President has—from the first moment—kept a precise record of everything that I have said; however, no one has called and asked for a copy of what I said. This affirms that my critics are not interested in the facts, but only in muddying the waters and in fawning to those who, after a taboo lasting decades, find it difficult to come to terms with certain things. No government representative or representative of the ruling coalition has made it clear to me in our numerous meetings that he does not share my view on this matter. Therefore, I perceive the statements of some opposition officials as an attempt to drive a wedge between myself and the ruling coalition. However, they will not succeed in this. And something else: It does not surprise me that it is the left that is defending the evacuation so robustly. Collectivism is close to it and, since communist collectivism has collapsed, it obviously needs national collectivism as a replacement, dividing nations into the guilty and the innocent.

However, in the elections, our citizens cast their votes for the ideal of a civic society in which each individual is responsible for his own acts and they cast their votes for parties that defend the inviolability of private ownership and all civil rights. Of course, following this path also means knowing how to admit that we did not always manage to govern ourselves by these principles.

The evacuation is a bygone act of a democratic government, an act confirmed by the victorious powers, an act legally valid and unchangeable. We are trying with difficulty to correct some of the wrongs of communism, but we cannot and will not rectify past history and thus commit new wrongs. That would be absurd. This absolutely unequivocal stance, however, does not relieve us

of the obligation to tell—in our own interest—the complete truth about our history, albeit unpleasant and unpopular, and to admit that even a democratic government was capable of succumbing to the Stalinist way of thinking and thus of preparing for the rise of Stalinism. This is a matter for our spiritual and moral wellbeing. The strength of our republic will not lie in avoiding the truth, but in the will to recognize it. *Invitation to Vaclav Klaus (as Chairman of the Civic Democratic Party) To Take Part in the Sudeten German Days in Nuremberg This Weekend*

Esteemed Mr. Chairman,

The proposal for a Sudeten German-Czech dialogue, which is also supported by many important German politicians of all persuasions, is indeed intended to overcome the barriers of the past and to seek a solution to the problems and a path toward a positive future.

As a sign of our desire to meet each other half way and seek a new beginning in relations between Czechs and Germans from Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, we would like cordially to invite you and other representatives from your party to this year's principal meeting of the Sudeten Germans at the Sudeten German Days 1994 in Nuremberg on the Whitsuntide weekend.

We would be pleased to welcome you among us. The enclosed honorary passes contain information on the most important events and points on the agenda of these Sudeten German Days, whose course and "Aussagen" [message] should promote a peaceful and conciliatory future.

I repeat my invitation and remain, with friendly greetings,

Yours,

Franz Neubauer. *The Letter From Representatives of the Sudeten German Council to the Chairman of the Czech Social Democratic Party; the Chairmen of the Other Political Parties Also Received a Similar Letter*

Esteemed Mr. Chairman,

The Sudeten German issue is constantly being aired and discussed in the Czech media. Such discussions—associated with assumptions and fear—are also being conducted among the people themselves.

This indicates that Sudeten German issues are indeed a problem that has still not been resolved so that it is possible to guarantee the further calm and successful development of the Czech Republic and of its relations with Germany.

The Sudeten Germans have long and repeatedly proposed and offered a Sudeten German-Czech dialogue, because only a dialogue begun without bias and accusation will overcome the prejudices, eradicate the misunderstandings, and bring the problems closer to a solution.

On account of many misunderstandings, we point out once again that the Sudeten German Council explained a long time ago that, for it, the issue of the borders has never come up. This means that all the models for a solution under discussion must be considered within the Czech Republic.

While this dialogue was begun some time ago on a lower platform and among people, it is still being rejected, as previously, in the political sphere. This does not only meet with incomprehension among us Sudeten Germans, but also among the faraway German and Austrian political circles.

Therefore, we invite you to participate in an extensive Czech- Sudeten German dialogue without bias! At the same time, we are convinced that you also see the need for such a dialogue to improve German-Czech relations. It would please us very much if you would accept our invitation to the talks.

It would certainly be meaningful if this dialogue could begin soon.

We suggest that the dialogue be preceded first by lower-level talks between representatives from the democratic parties in the Czech National Council and representatives from the Sudeten German Council aimed at reaching agreement on the participants, subjects, and dates for the dialogue.

We look forward to your timely point of view and remain, with cordial greetings,

Franz Neubauer, Volkmar Gabert, Herbert Werner, and Heinz Kraus.

Defense Minister Comments on 'Partnership'

LD2605175894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 26 May 94

[Interview with Defense Minister Pavol Kanis by correspondent Ivan Samel on 26 May; place not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Samel] Mr. Minister, what steps will be followed after the submission to NATO yesterday of the Slovak document on the Partnership for Peace program, both on Slovakia's and on NATO's part?

[Kanis] By presenting the document we have begun to institutionalize the process of implemenating the Partnership for Peace program. Relevant organizational structures will be created that will be involved in a specific program of joint actions, as expressed in the individual program. In this way, the basic prerequisites will be created for tackling the questions of Slovak security. A special NATO group will soon come to Bratislava to begin, along with our military and security specialists, to examine the content of the document we have presented to NATO, above all the proposals we have included in it which express our capabilities and resources which we will provide in the implementation of the document presented in Brussels. They will begin to confront the document with reality, with what Slovakia is capable of doing. Up to now, we have received offers for joint exercises from the Netherlands and Norway, and during a dinner the Romanian defense minister also proposed that we carry out such a joint exercise at which a military unit from a NATO member country would participate.

We are a small state wrestling with a number of problems and cannot efford to make mistakes in the procedure. We will carefully weigh up the whole situation which arises from the presentation document and create certain model situations. As soon as possible, we would like to prepare all the defense personnel who are going to share in the implementation of the presentation document to a degree which enables us to be perfectly prepared to cope when we take part in joint actions. [passage omitted]

[Samel] Unquestionably, the Russian Federation has a specific position in NATO's eyes. Can an individual treaty between NATO and Russia influence the form of the individual treaty concluded between Slovakia and NATO?

[Kanis] I believe that the course of NATO has shown that apparently no country has the chance of gaining any other status with regard to the partnership for Peace Program. Naturally, the Russian Federation is a great Euro-Asian power, and because of this it will apparently cooperate in a different manner. I would not exclude the possibility of certain problems being tackled through bilateral U.S.-Russian relations, outside the Partnership for Peace Program. My understanding of the situation is that within the Partnership for Peace program the Russian Federation will be in an equal position. This does not mean that some other, additional provisions will not be included, wither at the bilateral level or at the level of cooperation with NATO.

[Samel] Can a situation arise under which Slovakia would be compelled under certain circumstances, such as a treaty between Russia and the United States, to leave the Partnership for Peace program?

[Kanis] I totally exclude such a possibility. Central European nations and states today have an opportunity slowly to draw nearer to the West European and trans-Atlantic security, political, and economic structures. Therefore, I do not admit to such a possibility at all. The thing is to ensure that conditions are created within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program for small Central European nations and states to enable them, of their own will, to become a real entity in European politics.

SDL Leaders Differ on Possible Meciar Coalition

AU2605203094

[Editorial Report] Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak on 24 May on page 1 carries a 600-word interview with Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left, SDL, signed "alg" and entitled "I Do Not See Any Prospects of Cooperation." The interview, the place and date of which are not given, deals with the possibility of the SDL's post-election cooperation with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia,HZDS. The same issue is also the subject of a 300-word interview with SDL Deputy Chairman Milan Ftacnik by Robert Kotian in Bratislava SME in Slovak on 24 May on page 1.

In the SLOVENSKY DENNIK interview, Weiss is asked to react to an interview with SDL Deputy Robert Fico, published in the 20 May issue of LUC (BEAM), a regional daily published in Kosice, in which Fico reportedly said that "it should not be a problem for the SDL to cooperate with the HZDS after the elections, if the HZDS comes up with a program such as it had in 1992." Weiss replies that the HZDS electoral program and its practical policy are two different things, and continues: "I said before that the HZDS has become an etatist [etatisticky] movement pursuing a vulgar right-wing policy, aimed at satisfying the interests of the party's top echelons. It was simply impossible to cooperate with this policy. Moreover, the HZDS chairman personally did everything he could to damage relations with other political parties and their representatives. He personally destroyed all prerequisites for effective political cooperation." In Weiss' opinion, the SDL's decision to support the motion of no-confidence in Meciar on 11 March 1994 was correct: "We came out against a demagogic populist policy that was increasingly resorting to the crutches of nationalism, was irrational, and did not contribute to the solution of independent Slovakia's problems. So far, we have not received any signals that the HZDS would like to change this policy. The opposite is true. The HZDS election campaign is based on pitting Slovaks against the Hungarians and the Czechs and one

group of Slovaks against another group of Slovaks. It is based on the creation of the image of an enemy and we cannot agree with such policy."

Asked whether the SDL could cooperate with a HZDS without Meciar, Weiss replies that "Mr. Meciar is the strongest current in the HZDS and I cannot imagine the HZDS without Meciar." Weiss also denies the existence of any pressure from the SDL rank-and-file to cooperate with the HZDS after the elections. In conclusion, he reiterates that "if the HZDS policy does not change—and there is no indication of that—I see no basis for post-election cooperation with the HZDS."

In the SME interview, the place and date of which are not given, SDL Deputy Chairman Milan Ftacnik refuses to give a definite reply to the question of possible HZDS-SDL cooperation, arguing that the party leadership has not yet discussed the issue. Confronted with the statement made by SDL Deputy Robert Fico to the daily LUC that "there should be no obstacles" to post-election cooperation between the SDL and the HZDS, as long as the HZDS observes its 1992 program, Ftacnik says: "I consider this to be Deputy Fico's personal view. We have not yet discussed this issue in substance within the SDL. We are now prepared to clarify it in a democratic manner, first within the party and, subsequently, with our coalition partners. This can no longer be only our decision. The coalition partners are to submit by 30 June the principles of post-election cooperation and our party bodies should clarify this issue in substance by then."

Democratic Union 'Not Contemplating Coalition'

LD2605171294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0500 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] Representatives of rightwing forces in Slovakia held their third meeting last night, following the parliament session. Their one-hour discussion focused on the possibility of forming a strong rightwing election bloc. According to Jan Carnogursky, the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] is skeptical in that respect. That is what he briefly told me about the bloc, which is also represented by the National Democratic Party, the Democratic Union, the Democratic Party, and the Party of Businessmen and Tradesmen.

[Begin recording] [Carnogursky] If all of us wanted to form one election bloc, then according to the Elections Law, it would mean that we would have to win at least 10 percent of the vote in order to actually make it into the parliament. For that reason, we have simply continued pursuing our idea of getting rightwing deputies to the Slovak parliament. That trend will continue until 10 June. Thereafter, the party ticket will be complete because extending the process of forming election blocs and negotiating after 10 June would be wasteful.

[Reporter] Mr. Cernak [National Democratic Party chairman] said he will not form any election coalition without you, the KDH. What is the situation with regard to the Democratic Union, the party headed by a chairman who enjoys the greatest popularity of around 20 percent? What is the Democratic Union's reaction?

[Carnogursky] The Democratic Union intends to go into the elections alone and it is not contemplating a coalition with any other party. [end recording]

New Howitzer To Be Displayed at Brno Fair

AU2605132594 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 25 May 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "Zuzana's Premiere"]

[Text] Bratislava—Demonstrating the forms and potential of international military cooperation and of public control of the weapons industry is the aim of the second international exhibition of military technology, IDET '94, which will be held at the Brno fair grounds from 1 to 4 June 1994. The Association of the Slovak Republic Defense Industry will display there for the first time, under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, a new product from the ZTS [Heavy Engineering Works] Dubnica company—the self-propelled 155 millimeter howitzer, mounted on a Tatra 815 chassis, code-named Zuzana, which conforms to NATO equipment standards.

MDF, KDNP Reach Accord on Second Round

LD2605130794 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 26 May 94

[Excerpts] The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] have concluded a cooperation agreement for the second round of the elections. Under the Christian-democratic agreement, they are to back the candidates of the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] in some places as well. Agnes Pap reports.

[Pap] [passage omitted] MDF Spokesman Karoly Herenyi said that not only was joining forces between the parties at issue but also the necessity to make a broader agreement. The leading bodies of the KDNP and the MDF want the Christian-democratic pooling of forces to come about among the voters, including those who voted for the FKGP.

Herenyi said that the MDF's voters would support the FKGP's candidates in 42 places where they have a chance to win. Under agreements concluded with the FKGP county chairmen in Somogy and Tolna counties [southern Hungary], the FKGP candidates are to support the MDF candidates in five places. [passage omitted]

Boross Campaigns Against Two-Thirds Majority

LD2605221094 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1855 GMT 26 May 94

[Interview with Prime Minister Peter Boross by an unidentified announcer in the studio—live]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] [passage omitted] My one and only guest tonight is Prime Minister Peter Boross. I respectfully welcome you in the studio. [passage omitted]

About the immediate future, if you will allow me: You very often emphasize that you wish to hand over the departments to the new government members in an extremely careful and respectable manner. Why is it important to stress this?

[Boross] I make no secret of the fact that I would like to create a tradition with this. [passage omitted] So I have prepared appropriate materials, reports—reports containing data for information as well—at the various ministries, and this kind of thing is being prepared in the office of the prime minister, too.

It surprises me....[pauses] Perhaps it was Hungarian Socialist Party Chairman Gyula Horn who last night said to you first of all: I would like to see the handover report now. Well, all I can reply to this is that one should wait and see who becomes prime minister. We have to have the election, then an agreement. I will not now hand it over to two, perhaps three, or even four people—because that is how many there are, at least, of those who wish to be, or might be, prime ministers. Then naturally, I will begin contacts with them, and naturally also with the parties, after 29 May.

[Announcer] You mentioned the parties. How do you see the stakes in the second round?

[Boross] That the total number of deputies of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] should not reach two-thirds. For me it is less important whether the MSZP exceeds 50 percent or not; on the other hand it is very important—and everywhere I try to say this, to persuade the voters to vote but not to vote for these two parties—that they do not achieve the two-thirds majority.

Two-thirds is a very dangerous threshold. In various debates these gentlemen, that is those of the SZDSZ and the MSZP, say that they will wish to cooperate with the opposition on the basis of negotiation even if they have this kind of majority. But politics has shown that it is better if guarantees remain within legal frameworks, and to overstep the two-thirds threshold is very dangerous.

About 40 deputies will be needed for the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the Christian Democrats, the Smallholders, and the Federation of Young Democrats out of the 174 individual constituencies still undecided so that there will not be a two-thirds majority. I am trying to persuade the voters, perhaps even those who voted for the two seemingly victorious parties, that it is now in their interest to vote for the above, and mainly for the candidates of the MDF. In that way there will be a healthy parliamentary life. [passage omitted]

Minister on Revised Privatization Prospects

LD2605230294 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 2100 GMT 26 May 94

[Interview with Wieslaw Kaczmarek, Polish minister for ownership transformations, by unidentified announcer; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] By the end of 1998, there will be no state enterprises left in Poland. That is the barest possible summary of the consequences of the commercialization program of state enterprises that has been adopted by the government. The most important thing in this is, however, the fact that there has been sketched out therein an intended model for the shape of the Polish economy.

[Kaczmarek] The commercialization program is not, certainly, a conservation of the present arrangement. It is to be a program that will change the Polish economy. The commercialization program is, really, to consist of a number of drafts, of successive programs. The first will be based upon us wishing to transform the best, good, and large enterprises into the modern formula of companies with capital. Commercialization will reduce to the fact they will function upon the basis of the principles of the Commercial Code. Later they will be subject, successively, to privatization.

The second program will allow us to separate out from the group of 5,300 state enterprises still extant, the enterprises that are the weakest. This is served by a new formula proposed in the Law on State Enterprise, which will allow for a very, to put it rather unpleasantly, aggressive repair of these enterprises through the application of bank reconciliation procedures, agreed procedures, well, unfortunately bankruptcy procedures also, or else special programs prepared at the ministry, such as the stabilization-privatization-restructuring program. Everything that will serve to repair the enterprises.

The third program associated with commercialization will be a program—for we then have the small- and medium-sized enterprises still left over, and we intend to quickly and efficiently sell those enterprises [as heard]. The fourth component, this is a program that I will call the improvement in the condition of the state public finances and so the exploitation of state enterprises, thus earlier formed for the purposes of the creation of pension funds, a health insurance fund. Then this—when one looks at commercialization in such a context—can be seen that quite simply this is a quite considerable operation that is to run its course until the end of next year, and is later then still to fulfill one fundamental function.

[Announcer] The point at hand is that the commercialization program of state enterprises will be fulfilled through the, by many long expected, Law on the State Treasury.

[Kaczmarek] That which we have proposed and which we passed to the prime minister on Tuesday is the law on the management of the state treasury assets. For this purpose we will create special capital agencies. This will constitute a kind of identification of the owner, which will allow us to depart from the sectoral model of economy management, and for the ministry to fulfill regulative and administrative functions, but not ownership functions. The commercialization program is, in a word, I would say, this clearing of the ground for realistic, further ownership transformations, among which I would include privatization, restructuring, and the various paths to privatization, because we wish to maintain these different privatization paths. Quite simply, we must make up for a certain amount of lost time.

[Announcer] The transformation of state enterprises into single entity state treasury companies functioning on the basis of the Commercial Code must undoubtedly place into question the model of management of these enterprises hitherto.

[Kaczmarek] There are two factors here. Well, by the very nature of things the law that speaks of the principles of management of the finances of state enterprises falls by the wayside. We are moving away from the philosophy of the popiwek [the law on taxation of over the norm increases in remuneration], we are moving away from the philosophy of the compulsory dividend that was calculated upon the basis of book balance sheets, in favor of the solutions that are in force in the Commercial Code. We are changing the method of management of enterprises in favor of a stronger position for the manager, through the company board, and also through the body supervising the functioning of this company in the name of the State Treasury—this is the Supervisory Board. Well, we will as I say through the Law on the State Treasury seek to identify the owner in the form of the capital agencies. We are moving away from this sectoral model of the economy, and so I affirm that from the viewpoint of the enterprise, this will be an entity that will have precisely the opportunity to act on commercial principles, on the basis of the Commercial Code principles.

This is very important from the viewpoint of the identification of such an enterprise by a possible investor from outside. For, please believe me, he comes to Poland, and I have met him several times [laughs], and says that he cannot understand institutions such as the state enterprise on the basis of the laws of 1981. If there are such people who say that somewhere in the West there are state firms—then they have precisely the form of capital-based companies, and so they are based upon the principles of the Commercial Code [as heard]. We should be moving in that direction.

[Announcer] The adoption of the commercialization program of state enterprises will cause the minister for ownership transformations to gain in significance. Is this the end of the recently continuing dispute between the heads of the economic ministries over the form of privatization?

[Kaczmarek] Conflicts do not in fact exist. They are disputes of a certain kind. On the other hand, but, I think that they are disputes that are capable of being overcome. I would not wish to argue at all over the so-called rights of the owner, but rather over the concept for restructuring, over the programs for these firms. On the other hand, this program has one more characteristic that is worth mentioning here. It is precisely moving away from what the present coalition is often accused of at the moment, that it has a tendency toward the centralization of power. This program assumes in its philosophy precisely a decentralization of power, the lowering of these agencies to the level of the Polish macro-regions. Thus, the non-engagement of the central administrative offices in the administration of enterprises. Above all, they will be regional structures.

Mining Industry Restructuring Plan Approved

LD2705085694 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0736 GMT 27 May 94

[Text] The Sejm adopted today a government report on the second stage of restructuring the hard coal mining industry (in 1994-95), presented yesterday by Industry and Trade Minister Marek Pol.

The main goal of this stage of restructuring, according to the minister, is to achieve profitability by coal companies and to maintain it, to ensure competitiveness of Polish coal on foreign markets, to clear the mining industry's debts, to make funds for the modernization of collieries available, and to create conditions for pay rises to miners, thus reducing their uncertainty about job security. All this is to serve a supreme goal—the achievement of effectiveness and stability in the hard coal mining industry.

There were 242 votes for adopting the report, 27 against, and 53 abstentions.

Fast Track for Trilateral Commission Actions

LD2605173794 Warsaw PAP in English 1609 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] Warsaw, May 26—The cabinet Socio-Political Committee (KSPRM) decided Thursday that settlements of the trilateral commission for socio-economic issues would receive a fast legislative track treatment as matters of priority. Thursday's KSPRM meeting discussed the outcome of negotiations conducted within the trilateral commission and in six teams which are working out an agreement on social guarantees.

The committees secretary Grzegorz Rydlewski told journalists after the meeting that similar treatment would be given to questions ensuing from government-trade unions negotiations on social guarantees.

Head of the trilateral commission, Deputy Labour Minister Andrzej Baczkowski emphasized that the commission is not only a negotiating but also decision making organ. He also stressed that the commission examines all pressing demands put forward by the solidarity trade union which does not mean, however, that all of them would be satisfied.

Baczkowski confirmed that the government would not carry out bilateral negotiations with solidarity terming that form of talks as anachronistic.

Rydlewski added that the trilateral commission, grouping representatives of the government, trade unions and employers organizations, was a good instrument for solving unions demands. The next meeting of the trilateral commission will be held on June 6.

Governing Coalition's Policies Reviewed

94EP0061A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No. 20, 14 May 94 p 3

[Article by Marcin Krol, Warsaw University Professor, historian of ideas, editor in chief of NOWA RESPUBLICA, and columnist for TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY: "Coalition of Fear—True End of Worker-Peasant Alliance"]

[Text] In Great Britain a speaker's accent attracts considerable attention. Persons from lower social classes who have attained high social advancement try to speak with an Oxford accent proper for the higher classes. But when such a politician or businessman gets tense, he tends to speak with his childhood accent, such as a Liverpool one. Well, it is a similar thing with the Polish politicians who belong to the governing coalition. They try mightily to obliterate their PRL [Polish People's Republic] origin and sometimes they succeed, but when they become nervous the Liverpool in them emerges.

During the recent strikes, Deputy Prime Minister Cimoszewicz said that there will be no negotiations so long as the strikes continue, that is, under the strike gun, while Prime Minister Pawlak said that on the day of the great strike a lot of good happened because many people kept on working. Such comments are ludicrous, because, of course, the negotiations did go on during the strike and even succeeded. The fact that a person works is something normal rather than good. But such reversion to Liverpool language is typical; it demonstrates not so much the difficulty of getting rid of the burden of the past (which is hardly surprising) as that the more difficult it is to get rid of that burden the less substantive a comment can be and hence also the less can be accomplished. And it is my belief that the new-old coalition has nothing to say and can accomplish nothing.

It began its governance with empty rhetoric and lies. For such were the elements of the prime minister's opening address to the Sejm, which focused a lot on the evil doings of his predecessors and on making many promises, in particular to the world of science, education, culture, and health. It is not enough that since then nothing has been accomplished in those domains; on the contrary, they even regressed in terms of both budgetary allocations and restructuring. More even, at the Ministry

for National Education for the time being only numerous personnel changes have been made, and at the Ministry of Culture "Liverpool" reached its apogee, as best exemplified by the affair of the letter of Krzysztof Teodor Toeplitz. We also were lied to when they promised us a mysterious budget extending the social safety net; afterward Deputy Prime Minister Borowski was fired and the budget remained unchanged. Mendacity and blather are, besides, triumphant in practically every domain of public life and at every post. This is best exemplified by the unbelievably tangled affair of the "popiwek" [tax on wage increases], in which mendacity became an instrument employed not so much owing to lack of an opinion of one's own but deliberately and purposely.

The Unsuccessful Return

I am no Cato and know well that politicians lie all over the world, but there exist varieties of the political lie and turgid rhetoric is not so horrible when it substitutes for real political action and merely serves to satisfy the public demand for high-sounding phrases. But the politicians of the governing coalition lie, prattle, and do nothing. It is interesting that some of them, whether presumably or certainly more prominent, have lately clammed up. It appears they already know so much that they are not certain about anything.

How did it happen? Why did the "worker-peasant alliance" [Alliance of the Democratic Left and the Polish Peasant Party] so soon reveal its hopeless fecklessness? Why is it even now clear that the return is a resounding failure, that presumably this governing coalition will remain in power for some time yet but it will doubtless be its swan song?

It already common knowledge that this coalition won the elections by making promises it could not keep. But it is not as clear why it could not afterward, after taking power, formulate a clear program of action that would at least to some extent envisage fulfillment of pre-electoral promises. Well, I think that by now it is obvious why it did not happen. That coalition is a coalition of fear. From the very outset the factor keeping it together and determining its conduct was fear, and fear in several forms at that.

First, there is the fear of repeating the past. Thus, it prevented taking any explicitly socialist decisions, for which the representatives of the Labor Union and the OPZZ [National Alliance of Trade Unions] are, justly from their point of view, reproaching that coalition.

Second, there is the fear of interfering with the rather gratifying performance of the market economy, meaning the fear of forfeiting the accomplishments of the previous administrations, that is, the fear of deviating from the liberal course of the economy. Despite numerous attempts, that fear could not be covered up by clever social-democratic or peasant-populist speechifying, and it has become widely obvious.

Third, there is the fear of the presumed ideological electorate of that coalition, which directly led to strikes at the end of April. Thus, the first decisions of the Pawlak administration, made last November, were to make every concession to the demands of the striking miners, and it became obvious that with the approach of the spring there would be more such strikes.

Fourth, there is the fear of the coalition's own image, as clearly demonstrated by Prime Minister Pawlak when, on the very first occasion when something went wrong, he fired the concerned deputy minister (Kawalec) and recently also Deputy Minister Morawski, who is said to be the leading energy expert in Poland.

Fifth, there is the fear of the mass media, initially less evident within the SLD [Alliance of the Democratic Left] but by now obvious there too. That fear is that they have nothing to say and do not understand the role of the mass media and, basically, show no interest in winning over public opinion, which wears no blinkers and is not deceived.

Sixth, there is the fear of the president, who to be sure cannot, under the Constitution, wreak any real harm on the coalition but who serves as its only vehicle for credibility with the public, as could be seen from the enraptured faces of the SLD activists when they recently met with Walesa.

Seventh and last, there is the fear of the people who get nothing out of the coalition government, a fear that has prompted it to distribute more or less 20 million zlotys apiece to each farmer, allegedly as a loan for fertilizers, and to keep that decision secret so that the remaining public would not know what its taxes are being spent on.

Another factor accounting for the existence of the coalition is opportunism. To be sure, I do not think opportunism in public life to be something entirely negative. After all, opportunism as adaptation to circumstances which may not always be foreseeable is often proof of common sense. Provided, however, that such opportunism is accompanied by strong political convictions for whose sake compromises, often hardly palatable, are made. But the governing coalition has no such convictions, just as it has no program of action, and hence in its case opportunism is a totally negative attitude, a way of remaining afloat in spite of all undertows and eddies.

This opportunism is, to cite just a few instances, clearly reflected in the nearly total turnabout in the governing coalition's views on Poland's membership in NATO. Prior to the elections the SLD was in many ways critical of that idea, but after the elections, when it realized that the Polish public is remarkably united on this issue, it jettisoned all of its criticisms. Another example of opportunist conduct is the budget voted by the coalition, which basically does not embody any of its campaign promises. That also applies to its attitude toward privatization, restitution of nationalized property, and other economic issues. But most characteristic from that standpoint is the avoidance of taking a stand on any

issue that might provoke a serious political dispute. A coalition that won the elections upon proclaiming its desire to combat corruption, organized crime, and smuggling, has done nothing at all about the issues and has not dared to organize any major trial.

Finally, the coalition's opportunism is reflected in its attitude toward other political parties and views. In that domain the governing coalition remains passive, does not try to prove anything, and does not show the will to demonstrate the justness of its (nonexistent) decisions. It simply evades any dispute. It also avoids, at any price, internal disputes. This is clearly demonstrated not only by its treatment of Deputy Prime Minister Borowski but also by the tacit consent of the SLD to the dangerous protectionist aspirations of the PSL [Polish Peasant Party]. The position of Prime Minister Pawlak is so strong for the very reason that the SLD's decision on such a precise structure of the government ensued from a rotten compromise or opportunism for which there is no longer any remedy. The PSL, as a supposedly Catholic party (something which it has never before advertised), serves as a liaison between the coalition and the Roman Catholic Church and thus takes care of the opinions of the peasants, which are anachronistic by virtue of their social and economic situation. But it is precisely this alliance with the PSL that prevents the SLD from pursuing any explicit policy and condemns it to failure in the struggle for a new shape of Polish domestic policy or, in other words, turns the SLD into an antimodernist force.

A Weak Root

Fear and opportunism are subjective factors, which depend more on the leaders and members of the coalition parties than on the external situation. But we also are dealing with objective factors owing to which there is not, and shall not be, any longer any future for that coalition. The most important of those factors is deracination.

The unexpectedly big electoral win of the SLD and the PSL imbued the two parties with the belief that they have social support. But that belief is as illusory as were the social expectations that brought victory to the parties. We are perfectly aware that there will be no free lunch and no guaranteed procurement prices, and practically everybody had known it from the outset, but there was hope that in some mysterious way the new-old parties would alleviate the pain of the economic reforms. That did not happen because it could not happen. In Poland nowadays there is no social class that can fight for its privileges effectively and sensibly. The SLD and the PSL came to power with about the same attitude as that of the socialists of the late 19th century, that is, of an era when the working class had really been exploited and had something to fight for. Nowadays there are no such class and no justified partisan goals.

The SLD and the PSL lack a past of their own, and as for the communist past ascribed to them, they want to forget it at any price. But no kowtowing references to Witos [Wincenty Witos, the prewar peasant-party leader] can obscure the fact that most of the PSL's current leaders used to belong to the ZSL [United Peasant Party], just as the leaders of the SLD used to belong to the PZPR. However, as that past is so burdensome, with what origin should these parties identify themselves and what identity should they clothe themselves with? Without a principled program, without support from a nonexistent class society—let us bear in mind that it was precisely workers who did not at all vote for the SLD—without a history and language of its own, a party is condemned to nonexistence. That is a problem that has also been encountered by parties of Solidarity origin. So how are parties of PRL origin to build their own image for internal and external consumption?

But is that so important after all? Yes, because in the absence of roots surface existence is not possible. For a political movement, roots are what keeps it together and a means of internal communication and rapport with the outside world. Aleksander Kwasniewski lost headway after several brilliant speeches, because his party lacks a language whereby he could speak constructively about anything, and as for the linguistic utterances of Prime Minister Pawlak, they demonstrate that the PSL lacks any original concepts and approaches of its own. Standing on the brink of the abyss, and work ethic, and consider recently also that recent amazingly feckless Sejm speech, whose culmination was the following passage: "...I was raised under other circumstances and in another system of values. That is why accord, cooperation, mutual goodwill, and working together are closer to me than conflict...." The prime minister was probably thinking of his native rural community and he simply forgot that in the 1980's he used to be a member of the youth wing of the ZSL and that those times were hardly times of accord and goodwill. His desperate search for arguments led him to point to such roots at the expense of drastically deviating from the truth. It thus can be seen that the PSL under its present leaders can be, objectively speaking, only a peasant party, that this is its sole root, but it is not a root that qualifies it to govern the country.

Lastly, deracination leads to a reaction that is literally reactionary, meaning that it prompts searching for people from one's old former world and shutting oneself up in that world. The suspicion that the SLD and the PSL will come to rely on men who had played the second fiddle in the former PRL has by now been proven on a large scale, and that is not surprising because these parties can form a world of their own jointly only with such people, a world that is not a world of ideas, programs, or politics, but merely a world of sentiments and resentments.

Presumed Leftism

Another objective factor ruining the chances of that coalition for the future is its—also objective—inability

to build a constructive vision of itself and, as a consequence, a constructive vision of its own policy and of Poland. In that case, too, the SLD and the PSL suffer an ailment that is also shared by post-Solidarity groupings. But for the governing coalition the problem is much more difficult to resolve, because developing a constructive vision is difficult in the absence of roots, a program, social support, and internal human and ideological cohesiveness. That is precisely why, rather than owing to some special indolence, the government acts with such an improbable sluggishness that it can be only compared with the government of Jan Olszewski (with which it has many features in common anyhow). That also is why we so often perceive the absence of mutual loyalty binding members of the government, deputy prime ministers, and the prime minister.

Still, even a constructive program is not what matters most if current problems can be effectively and rapidly resolved. But the absence of either leads to a paralysis of the political scene, in which the president now and then quite unexpectedly intervenes so as to either add to the general confusion or lead to some unexpected decisions. From the beginning it was known that this government can endure on two conditions: That it shall fairly consistently continue the economic policy established by former Prime Minister Balcerowicz and that it will somehow reach an understanding with President Walesa. For the time being the governing coalition is meeting both those conditions, but that does not mean that it has succeeded in making a contribution of its own to the new reality. If anybody thinks differently, how about giving me just one example of a constructive action by the new coalition. I am not aware of any.

Besides, it is worth noting that this coalition came to power with the byword of "leftism." Even very serious people such as Stanislaw Stomma have acknowledged that the times are ripe for the Left, because in times of change the Left is more suitable than the Right, whose purpose is rather to correct excessively radical actions of the Left. We all for awhile let ourselves be bamboozled by that supposed leftism of the SLD and the PSL, whereas it now turns out that power was taken by an ideological zero.

What will happen next? Why do I believe that the end has come? For awhile we can still expect this administration to continue, but it does not seem likely that the present governing coalition will endure until the next elections. What is still more important, it does not seem likely that this coalition or its components will develop into a clear and sensible opposition in Poland. If some members of the former Solidarity opposition went rather far in flirting with the representatives of the current coalition, that was because they had thought that a new partner in political life has appeared on the scene, a partner with whom they would have to cohabit long and therefore it was better to maintain sensible contacts with the Communists rather than to point a finger at their past. This approach has proven mistaken, not only because it has caused the society to accept its recent enemy, but also because for awhile it afforded some legitimacy to the old-new coalition. But even now it can be seen that there is nobody to talk with (not in the sense of any absence of reasonable and witty individuals in the government), because there is nothing to talk about. If that is so while this coalition is in power, then it will simply evaporate once it becomes the opposition after losing the elections, that being the fate that awaits it sooner or later. Essentially, everything depends on whether the present-day opposition learns to create a workable party organization and electoral machinery and on when that will come true.

The expectation that the worker-peasant alliance will become a thing of the past hardly saddens me. But in the end we should consider the present and future consequences of this era of coalition government to the present and future of Poland. To the present, as can be seen, the consequences will be fatal, because the pace of the reforms will slow down, markedly, solely, and exclusively through the fault of the present government. As for the future, the consequences will depend on whether such political motivations as fear, opportunism, and negation as a principle of action, and such objective conditions as deracination and inability to build a constructive vision of Poland will become a permanent feature of Polish life. For it may happen that the coalition not only will itself become a loser, but also will drag down with it the entire Polish political scene. It may thus happen that a rebirth can be expected only after yet another revolution and that only then will virtue and courage resume their proper place in public life. I do not know whether this is an expression of hope or horror, but I know for certain that those who, though aware of the burden of the past resting on them, have nevertheless taken power, now find themselves in a much worse situation than formerly. Formerly they could argue that they had been unable to accomplish much under the PRL, but now they can only acknowledge that they can do nothing. As for us, we unfortunately have to endure all this somehow.

Foreign Ministry Official Comments on Crimea

AU2505205194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 25 May 94

[Telephone interview with Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Simona Miculescu by an unidentified correspondent on 25 May—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] We have phoned you because we would like to know the opinion of the Romanian Foreign Ministry on the events in the Crimea.

[Miculescu] Good evening. Certainly I am going to answer you with greatest pleasure, as I do every time for the Romanian Radio Station. I could say that the Romanian side is following the evolution of situation in Ukraine with great attention. In connection with the recent events in Crimea, events that, as a matter of fact, are the subject of much information issued in the Romanian and foreign press, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes that this represents an internal problem of Ukraine, because Crimea is part and parcel of this neighboring country of Romania.

Likewise, I would like to mention that we assess the careful attitude adopted by the authorities of the Russian Federation on this issue as a positive sign. I would like to conclude by expressing hope that this situation will be solved through political means and it is our belief that the consolidation of independence and stability in Ukraine is very important for the entire region and Europe in general.

[Correspondent] Thus, if the situation is settled through political means, in view of this settlement, what are the actions planned by the Romanian diplomacy to intensify relations with Ukraine, a country that is our neighbor?

[Miculescu] Certainly we hope that this political settlement will come as soon as possible, and in practical terms, as you well know, obviously we will work for the development and consolidation of bilateral relations with this neighboring country and we will amplify political dialogue at all levels. However, at the appropriate time, we are going to inform you about all details and I hope we will be able to give you those details as soon as possible.

[Correspondent] In fact we wanted to find out whether there is any immediate action on the diplomatic agenda of the Romanian foreign minister in connection with Ukraine.

[Miculescu] There are no immediate plans, but we will inform you at the appropriate time, as we do every time.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much for this interview.

[Miculescu] It was my great pleasure.

Gherman Calls For Political 'Pragmatism'

AU2405202094 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 19 May 94 p 3

[Article by Oliviu Gherman, president of the Social Democracy Party of Romania and president of the Senate, in response to a 14 May interview with Vasile Secares, president of "A Future for Romania" Group: "Politics From the Outside"]

[Text] I have carefully read Mr. Vasile Secares' interview with CURIERUL NATIONAL and I cannot refrain from making a few remarks in this connection. I would like to point out that I do not intend to enter into a polemical discussion with Mr. Secares, but I would rather try to clarify a few points raised in my interview with the same newspaper, an interview that was published a few days before his interview. For the uninformed reader, I would like to recall that "A Future for Romania" was initially the title of one of the three motions submitted to the 28 March 1992 National Convention of the former National Salvation Front [FSN], a motion that was not adopted. During the aforementioned convention, the FSN split and a grouping initially called the Democratic National Salvation Front [FDSN] and later the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] emerged. What happened with the "A Future for Romania" option? Well, it remained outside the party structures, turning itself into a kind of "Political Academy," with an internal life tacitly supported through the functioning of the National School for Administrative Studies and Police, an institution sponsored by this grouping.

Of course, as I said, sometime in the middle of 1990, it is infinitely easier to sit on the sidelines and criticize what others are doing. By getting involved, you must cover the sinuous road of achievements and failures, which constantly exposes you to justified criticism of your mistakes. Examining now the road covered by the PDSR (and the FDSN previously), I can honestly say that many things could have been done differently than they actually were. Unfortunately—or maybe one should say fortunately—in politics, like in life, you cannot simultaneously follow two roads. You cannot both take a medicine and also not take it if you want to check its usefulness. In politics, you must assume responsibility for decisions where the alternatives are not clear-cut. Most often, you have to choose between 45-55 percent solutions, in circumstances whereby it is impossible to estimate the evolution of the two choices. The people involved in politics are held responsible for all bungling decisions, while the fact that someone has to take a decision of sorts is often omitted. Therefore, we would have gladly welcomed the involvement of the supporters of the aforementioned motion in a party political activity and we would have applauded their successes and criticized their failures. That would have been a more manly and honest dispute. Unfortunately, the majority of motion supporters, including Mr. Vasile Secares, preferred to remain outside the party battle and

slightly above it so as to occasionally pass judgment—often quite pertinently—on the political climate in Romania. It is like writing reports about a war you are not participating in. However, there is no doubt that they are entitled to their choice. Returning to my previous interview, I would like to emphasize several other elements. First, referring to the political crisis in Romania, Mr. Secares fails to give an appropriate explanation. If he wants to characterize the entire post-December 1989 political life in our country by using the term "crisis," then I must agree with him: Yes, we are going through a political crisis characteristic of the stage of political infancy, whose main feature is the miming of authentic politics, which is not suitable to Romania's situation of today. Indeed, by avoiding the imperious requirements of the current period, the political forces in Romania engaged themselves in a sterile dispute that has nothing to do with what must be done by all of us. I remember a significant moment. A few weeks ago—to be more precise, in a television broadcast on Monday 25 April—correspondent Cristache asked Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front) [PD(FSN)], whether he feels he is fulfilling his mission of parliamentarian. With his known elegance and precision, Mr. Petre Roman presented a summary of the parliamentary actions, with which he has combated the governmental solutions. It was a kind of synopsis of an opposition stance. There is no doubt that we do not have the right to ignore the barricade side we happen to be on. Nevertheless, reality is above us all. I would have liked to ask my friend and political adversary Petre Roman what his answers might have been to all those accusations if he had been the leader of the government party or the country's prime minister? In today's conditions, are we allowed to change our options from one extreme to the other in function of our stand vis-a-vis those temporarily in power at a certain point? May we change our position vis-a-vis the relations with the IMF, as a function of whether we are in power or not? Therefore, proceeding from this example, I agree with the term of "politicking" used in the aforementioned interview, a term attributed to the attitude of the majority of the political parties in Romania.

If Mr. Secares is exclusively referring to the current moment when talking about the political crisis in Romania, I will tell him that he is wrong and tendentious. As I have already said in the past, the concept of political crisis, as it refers to a given moment, is a formula invented by the opposition in its attempt to gain political capital. For a long time, the PDSR was damned for everything by having the most colorful invectives hurled at it: neo, crypto, and everything else that could be put before the word "communist" was attributed to the party to suggest the revival of communism.

Initially, things were simplified to ridiculous proportions when one proceeded to evaluate the Romanian political spectrum: On the one hand, you had an identifiable evil—that is, the PDSR, an infernal instrument of the return to the past; on the other hand, you had an incontestable good, represented by the forces of opposition, which are allegedly promoting progress and reform, although they opposed all measures for their implementation. This kind of evaluation lasted until a stable majority centered around the PDSR took shape. With the emergence of this majority, the concept of political crisis also emerged. The script is so simple and clear that I am offended by the hope of those who concocted it that we would fall into the trap set for us. The first stage consisted in an attempt to isolate the PDSR from its allies, which helped our party cover the Calvary of reform, by omitting to mention that those who claim to want the reform were also the ones who actually raised the greatest obstacles in the path of reform. I do not want to give examples, so as to not appear too obvious. The second stage consisted of an attempt to turn the PDSR, which ceased to be called neocommunist, into a kind of ping-pong match between the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] and the PD(FSN)—that is, into a kind of minority beggar within a coalition that would have decided its existence.

The solution proposed by Mr. Secares for solving the hardships of the transition in Romania is a variant of the "A Future for Romania" type, that is a nonparty or supraparty variant, which would realign the parliamentarians—some from the PDSR, others from the CDR, and some from the PD(FSN). First of all, I regret that his solution omitted to mention the other parliamentary groupings, which are equally entitled to a role. I also cannot refrain from raising a scholarly question: On the basis of what criteria will those parliamentarians be elected? Are we going to set up a supraparty or an extraparty of just a few people? I believe the realistic thing to do is to convince all parties that, for a certain period of time, we must all work together to come out of the deadlock, while maintaining our identity, as it is confirmed by the various parliamentary and extraparliamentary official acts.

I am saying all this because I am deeply convinced that Mr. Secares' solution, although attractive at first glance, is mere utopia. I agree that we are at a crossroads, albeit less obvious than the ones we have put behind us in the past one and a half years of government. I agree that we must undertake something to ensure the triumph of the good values. However, unlike Mr. Secares, I believe that this can only be achieved from within the parties, be they good or less good, as the situation is today. We must pool our political efforts, but only after clarifications that must occur within each party. In the medium run, the parties must shape Romania's political life around several basic choices based on pragmatism: center-right, center, and center-left, with their natural satellites, to preserve the stability of the political spectrum.

Silajdzic Flies to Zagreb For Talks on Bihac

AU2605180894 Paris AFP in English 1737 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] Geneva, May 26 (AFP)—Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic flew Thursday [26 May] to Zagreb for emergency talks on the situation in the Bihac pocket in northwestern Bosnia, under Serb attack, Bosnia's representative said here. Silajdzic, who headed his delegation at two days of peace talks in the French lake resort of Talloires, near Switzerland, flew from Geneva aboard the same plane taking back the Bosnian Croat delegation, Mustapha Bijedic said.

It was not immediately known who Silajdzic would be meeting in Zagreb, but Bijedic said "the situation was very serious" in the Moslem-held Bihac pocket. "The Serbs have launched an offensive against one of the UN safe areas in Bosnia (Bihac) and Mr. Akashi (the UN's special envoy to Yugoslavia) and the West are doing nothing," Bijedic said.

The UN Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) confirmed that Serb forces have launched an offensive over the past 24 hours against Bihac, the western tip of Bosnia tucked into Croatia and besieged by Serb forces. The Serbs managed "a small advance" after firing more than 500 shells at Moslem positions on Wednesday, UNPROFOR said.

Bijedic refused to give any details on the two days of closed- door talks Wednesday and Thursday in the French Alpine hideaway which involved the warring parties, along with representatives of the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations. The parties have agreed however to meet again in about 10 days, he said.

Aleska Buha, foreign minister of the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb Republic, said the talks would again take place in Talloires.

Izetbegovic Demands 'Urgent Action'

AU2605145094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] Prompted by the attacks on the Bihac security zone, President of the State Presidency Alija Izetbegovic has written to the heads of state of the member countries of the contact group for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN secretary general, and the Security Council presiding member. At dawn this morning, the Serbian forces began an extensive attack on the Bihac security zone, which has been surrounded since the beginning of the war. Our troops are putting up a bitter resistance, but the situation is extremely grave. I appeal to you to take measures for the protection of the Bihac security zone that are in accordance with the applicable UN Security Council resolutions. The situation is extremely critical and calls for urgent action. This is stated at the end of President Izetbegovic's letter.

Sarajevo Radio Reports Attacks

AU2605144194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 26 May 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[Text] After yesterday and last night's bestial shelling of Bihac and the outskirts of Cazin, the joint aggressors today continued their attacks on the Bihac Commune. The chetniks are using mortars and howitzers of all calibers to shell the forward defense lines on the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau and Grabez, while on Hasin Vrh and Vrsak they continue attempts at infantry breakthroughs. The 5th Corps members are energetically resisting, and the defense lines remain stable. On the other parts of the front, they continued using antiaircraft weapons, while sniper fire and small arms' fire has intensified.

The members of Abdic's paramilitary army are also not quiet. They are increasingly collaborating with their allies. In the wider area of Trsak, Viskovac, and Todorovo, they haven been concentrating fresh forces and hardware since yesterday, and are preparing fresh attacks in collaboration with the chetniks. In the course of the day, they have been intensifying activity on all demarcation lines, using small arms, antiaircraft arms, and armor-piercing weapons.

Army Recaptures Territory

AU2705095994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 27 May 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[Text] Throughout last night and this morning chetnik artillery has been pounding the Bihac area. From their strongholds in Veliki (Radic), and Grabez, the chetniks have been shelling parts of this UN protected zone with howitzers and mortars, and trying to conceal this behind the [words indistinct] conflict caused by Abdic's traitor clique.

Dozens of shells were fired overnight at the outskirts of Bihac, while the defense lines on the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau, Hasin Vrh, and Grabez have been under continuous mortar fire. In decisive counterattacks, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps has recaptured some of the territory on the plateau, inflicting heavy losses on the chetniks in manpower, and capturing a large amount of ammunition and equipment. This must have been the reason for the start of the chetniks' bestial shelling of civilian targets, which also served as a sign to the Kladusa traitor paramilitaries to intensify their own attacks on the areas of [word indistinct], Pecigrad, (Liskovac), and Todorovo.

UN Commander Reports Attacks

AU2605142294 Paris AFP in English 1352 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] Sarajevo, May 26 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb troops have made a small advance in the western pocket of Bihac following intense shelling of the region, a UN commander stationed in Bihac said Thursday [26 May]. Major Jean-Francois Philippe, spokesman for the French battalion based in the Moslem-held city, said the Serbs advanced by about a kilometre (less than a mile) in the southeastern part of the pocket Wednesday after launching a barrage of 500 shells against positions of the mainly-Moslem Bosnian Army stationed north of the city.

The Serbs also reportedly launched infantry assaults on several villages north of Bihac, a UN-declared "safe haven." Philippe said the Serbs want to reclaim territory captured by the Bosnian Army along the Una River and a railway line that runs nearby. According to Bosnian military sources, the army still controls some 40 kilometres (25 miles) of the railway line, which is crucial to the Serbs who are trying to link the separatist Croatian region of Krajina with the Serb-held stronghold of Banja Luka, in western Bosnia.

The Serbs have also started building a railway line in order to link the northeastern Bosnian town of Brcko with the nearby town of Bijeljina and Serbia proper. Philippe said the situation in Bihac was calm Thursday although clashes erupted Wednesday evening between government forces and troops loyal to Moslem separatist leader Fikret Abdic, who has brokered his own ceasefire with the Serbs in areas he controls.

Elsewhere in Bosnia Thursday, the army was pursuing its offensive against Serb troops in the northern town of Tesanj but UN observers stationed in the region said they had not detected any territorial gains. In the eastern town of Gorazde, meanwhile, Serb commanders were still refusing to pull armed troops from a UN-imposed three- kilometre (1.8-mile) exclusion zone around the city.

Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose, the commander of UN troops in Bosnia, met Wednesday with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic in an attempt to convince him to pull government troops from the east bank of the Drina River, which runs through Gorazde, UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokesman Robert Annink said. He said the retreat is the Serbs' "condition for withdrawing from the three-kilometre zone." Annink added that although a UN resolution on Gorazde does not call for troops withdrawal, the belligerants must "make a step to show their good faith." The Serbs last weekend ignored a pledge they had made to pull their armed forces from the three-kilometre zone.

In other developments Thursday, three field clinics donated by Britain began operating in Mostar, in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, devastated by fighting between Moslems and Croats before both sides agreed a federation plan earlier this year.

Muslims, Croats May Retreat on Land Demand

LD2605191694 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 26 May 94

[Excerpts] The talks the between international mediators and the three warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended in the French town of Talloires today. No agreement on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina was reached. Journalists were banned from the talks venue, and the representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina sides refused to comment. REUTERS reports that the Muslim, Serb, and Croat representatives are ready to resume talks in France or in Geneva within seven to 10 days.

[Unidentified correspondent] It is becoming obvious that the secret peace talks were only testing grounds for Bosnia-Herzegovina's warring sides; a preliminary exchange of opinions with the members of the Contact Group who are trying, as they stress, to complete their peace-building task in a professional and efficient way. [passage omitted]

The unity between the Croat and Bosniak delegations was noticeable during the talks. They presented good arguments to advocate the principles of the Washington and Vienna Agreements. In the name of a lasting peace Bosnian Croat leader Kresimir Zubak and Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic announced a possible retreat from the initial negotiating positions of 58 percent for the federation. However, the Serbs do not consider the percentage as the most important element. They are requesting richer and better quality territories.

The maps and haggling over the territorial division certainly dominated the talks. However, all combinations are still possible. [passage omitted]

Karadzic: Solutions Cannot Be Forced On Serbs

LD2605135694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1302 GMT 26 May 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Uzice, Serbia, May 26 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) President Radovan Karadzic said on Thursday [26 May] that a new peace conference should focus solely on territorial issues because political solutions have already been reached—the United States has created a Muslim-Croat federation, and the Serbs their own state. We have a solution and our own state. We are willing to discuss territories but on condition that the sanctions are lifted and a peace established, Karadzic said in an interview to Uzice paper VESTI. He added that these two states should immediately be recognized.

Commenting diplomatic moves for speeding up the peace process, Karadzic underscored that the Serb side had told Cyrus Vance, Lord David Owen and Vitaliy Churkin that, if they want to succeed, they should

coordinate their efforts with the Serbs' interests. He said that a new peace conference can succeed only if a solution is not imposed on the Serbs. The end of the war is close because our enemies have tried everything and have clearly faced their own powerlessness, Karadzic said and added that this powerlessness clashed with the legitimate and justified will of the Serb people and their centuries-old wish to finally set up their own state.

Karadzic believes that the next moves of the Muslim-Croat side will be a new offensive out of one of the 'safe areas'—Tuzla or Bihac. We will defend ourselves for a time, then we will publically warn them, as in the case of Gorazde, and openly say that we will launch a counter-offensive in which case they will start wailing and the entire world will then try to save them and create their state, Karadzic said.

Rose, Izetbegovic Discuss Gorazde Cease-Fire

AU2605163694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 Gmt 26 May 94

[Text] Last night, General Michael Rose, commander of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] in Bosnia-Herzegovina, held talks with President of the Presidency Alija Izetbegovic on the implementation of the cease-fire and the deployment of peace forces on the east bank of the Drina River near Gorazde. This was announced today at the UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo.

General Rose proposed that Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units should withdraw from the east bank of the Drina River and that UNPROFOR units should be deployed in their place to protect Gorazde and maintain the cease-fire. On the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 913 and the NATO ultimatum, Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units are not obliged to withdraw from either this part of town or the 3-km exclusion zone around Gorazde. UNPROFOR representative Major Annink said that the NATO ultimatum was still in force. We [words indistinct] the situation realistically and we are trying to solve the problem in Gorazde through negotiations, said Major Annink today. He added that General Rose yesterday attempted to talk to the aggressor's leader Radovan Karadzic, but that he had not succeeded in this.

Rose Clarifies Statement on Army's Weakness

AU2605201094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] The statement made yesterday by the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] commander [General Rose] that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army did not have the strength to retake the lost territories met with widespread, mostly negative, reactions. That is why we were informed by the Office of the President of the Presidency that during last night's talks [with General Rose], President Izetbegovic asked General Michael Rose to explain his statement.

The British general supplemented his earlier remark by saying that he had also told the Serbs they could not win under any conditions. Their infantry is irreparably wounded, said General Rose, and in the long run, they would [word indistinct] lose the war in Bosnia. The UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina believes that, at the moment, the Serbs cannot defeat the Bosniaks, while the Bosniaks do not have the strength to expel the occupiers. A firm stalemate has been created in Bosnia, which, according to General Rose, is forcing both sides to look for a compromise to end the conflict. This is stated in the communique issued by the Office of the President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency.

Rose Pays 'Extremely Short' Visit to Gorazde

AU2705111694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 27 May 94

[Report by Enes Musovic from Gorazde]

[Excerpt] The long-awaited visit by General Michael Rose, commander of the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to Gorazde yesterday lasted only 20 minutes. During that extremely short time General Rose spoke with (Ferid Buljubasic), commander of the Eastern Bosnia Operative Group of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in Gorazde. The issues touched upon in this blitz conversation were the cooperation of the military authorities in Gorazde with the units of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR], and the problems connected with the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 913.

The general returned to Sarajevo with his associates, while the people of Gorazde remain in the same situation as prior to his visit. The aggressor's soldiers, dressed in uniforms of so-called Serbian police, yesterday afternoon inflicted severe wounds on a 10-year-old boy in the city district of Bare with a M-84 machine gun. [passage omitted]

Gradacac Reportedly Faces Renewed Serb Attacks

AU2705094294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 27 May 94

[Report by the Information Service of the 107th Chivalrous Motorized Gradacac Brigade]

[Text] This morning goes to prove the well-known fact that the relative quiet in Gradacac is a delusion, as the aggressor can turn this front quickly and suddenly into a scene of total war. Gradacac and the surrounding area have been vibrating to the thunder of heavy shells exploding since 0530 this morning. The enemy launched this extremely powerful artillery attack from Gornje Krecane with three tanks, 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, recoilless guns, and all kinds of antiaircraft weapons. At the time of this report, over 500 shells have already landed on the defense lines in Novalici, (Osmanovici), and Vida. Over 50 have been directed at the town center.

This situation reminds us of the time of July 1992. Gradacac is experiencing true hell. This is the worst morning of the war this year.

At about 0800 the chetniks launched an infantry attack at the area of (Osmanovici), but it was successfully repelled. [words indistinct] Jasenica, and Rajska also came under a very heavy artillery, infantry, and armored attack early this morning. As we report, the situation on the front is deteriorating further and the attacks seem to be intensifying. The aggressor is firing howitzers at the town center. But despite everything the defense lines are firm and stable.

Eastern Mostar Gets First Electricity Supplies

AU2705112194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 27 May 94

[Text] According to the latest information from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Electricity Board, the technical conditions have been created for the eastern part of Mostar to receive one megawatt of electricity. This amount is sufficient for priority consumers, and there will also be some distributed to the general public, insofar as this can be done through the very badly damaged distribution network. Repairs are under way on two more facilities to provide Mostar with electricity. At the same time work is under way on repairing the street lights and the first light bulb has already started to illuminate Mostar.

Shops, Businesses Closed as Army Shells Doboj

AU2705112094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 27 May 94

[Text] Today, by 1100, a general danger alarm had been sounded three times in Doboj as Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] artillery constantly shelled the city center from the direction of Tesanj. The fiercest Muslim attacks in the last few months started shortly after 0800 this morning. They were stepped up at 0900, and after a brief break, resumed at 1030. More than 10 tank and mortar shells landed on and around the city center area during this period. According to first reports, the material damage is considerable. There are no reports on possible casualties yet, although ambulances are to be heard in the town. Owing to the artillery attacks on the town yesterday and today, schools, shops, businesses, and other public institutions are not functioning in Doboj. Only the hospital, the police, and the civil defense are working. This has been a report by our correspondent Brane Bozic.

Serbs Barred From Inspecting Cargo at Tuzla

LD2705104194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0845 GMT 27 May 94

[Text] Banja Luka, 27 May (TANJUG)—The Muslim side has not allowed a representative of the republic of Srpska army to take part in the inspection of cargo at Tuzla's Dubrave airport. The cargo is for UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] units and reportedly it also contains humanitarian aid for the Muslim side, it was learned today in circles of the republic of Srpska army.

It has been agreed with UNPROFOR's mediation that one representative of the republic of Srpska army will inspect every plane cargo. However, since the agreement was cancelled, cargo has continued to arrive by planes with no control. No one has said anything about what will happen to the agreement. This example shows how much the Muslims care to substantiate the assurances that no military equipment is being shipped to Tuzla airport, that is, how much goodwill there is to take part in peace processes, the republic of Srpska army circles say.

Violence Among Croats in Siroki Brijeg

94BA0277A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 10 May 94 pp 8, 9

[Article by Ivan Petric: "Tuta and Djapic Are Threatening"]

[Text] The people around Tuta Naletilic have taken the law into their own hands. They demonstrated on Djapic what they have been doing for a long time throughout Siroki Brijeg—violence. They are collecting taxes from businessmen, dealing in drugs and weapons, and stealing and reselling automobiles.

Spokesman Ante Djapic and the rest of the leadership of the Croatian Rights Party [HSP], who were beaten up before the beginning of the HSP forum in Siroki Brijeg, according to witnesses' statements, still fared well. Specifically, just when the forum was supposed to start in a Siroki Brijeg hotel, from among about 100 curious people who had come to that party's meeting, which was expected to be like any other, a group of about 20 young men came out of the audience and assaulted the HSP members, almost beating them to death with tables, chairs, hammers, and sticks. When the uproar and the brawl began most of those present, seeing what was going on, simply fled from the hotel and did not appear in the city again throughout the entire evening.

Nor did they appear even on later evenings after that event in the cafes and restaurants of Siroki Brijeg, which were otherwise open until late at night (after midnight) because of the pleasant weather; instead, patrons slowly begin to disperse as early as twilight. At 2200 the patrons can already be counted on one's fingers, and half an hour later there is no longer anyone either in the cafes or on the streets. Fear has seized Siroki Brijeg, but if you ask someone what really happened—a lot of people see it happen—you will get silence. The situation is reminiscent of the atmosphere that prevailed in Sicily before the Italian Government decided to settle accounts openly with the Mafia.

It Started With Kraljevic

The event in the Siroki Brijeg hotel also has its prehistory, however. It was drawn out for a long time in the media, but it started with the arrival of Djapic in Herzegovina after the murder of Blazo Kraljevic, a general in the HOS [Croatian Defense Forces], and another eight members of his escort. At that time it was officially announced that someone from Kraljevic's escort had been the first to open fire against special forces at a checkpoint in Krusevo, close to Mostar, and then all nine HOS members and one of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] special forces members died in the shooting. In the media, and several times in the Assembly, Djapic publicly (without names, admittedly) called upon the legal system of Herceg-Bosna, but also Croatia, to bring those who had committed the murder to justice.

Furthermore, he constantly linked the murder of HSP leader Ante Paradzik (killed at a similar checkpoint in Sesvete) and the murder of Blazo Kraljevic and the eight HOS members, also saying that someone "powerful" in the Croatian Defense Ministry was behind it all. He threatened several times that he would publish the names of those who had committed the murder in Krusevo near Mostar. Since that threat mainly applied to Tuta Naletilic and the members of his battalion, Tuta, upon Djapic's arrival in Herzegovina, responded by threatening him not to appear in Siroki Brijeg, according to Djapic.

Djapic did not pay attention, and his two forums in Grude and Tomislavgrad were relatively well-attended (Djapic's HSP does not enjoy a high reputation in Herzegovina, he believes) and peaceful, with only tense speakers, which is also usual for other parties. Djapic and his escort also appeared at the Siroki Brijeg hotel. Tuta apparently kept his promise, and so in just a few minutes his people, rushing out of the audience, created scenes that revolted those who witnessed them. They say that it was like detective movies. About 20 thugs simply began to beat the people sitting at the table with everything at hand (and the clubs that they brought with them), hitting all parts of their bodies, heads, legs, and backs. Those who fell immediately, bloodied, received a few more blows, and the rest screamed and called for help. No one came to their assistance, however, because it is known in Siroki Brijeg that anyone who opposes Tuta's group is risking his life.

Minister Also Beaten Up

On the morning of the next day, in front of the same hotel, Herceg-Bosna defense minister Vlado Soljic, himself a resident of Siroki Brijeg, was also beaten up. Some people say that he was struck quite accidentally, because he was passing close to the uproar, which had continued since the previous evening. This was all followed by a communique from the Herceg-Bosna Defense Ministry's Political Administration, which turned things around: Djapic and his companions were accused of wanting to start new conflicts between Croats and Muslims and prevent implementation of the Washington agreement. The kind of communique involved is sufficiently indicated by the fact that not a single Muslim has ever lived in Siroki Brijeg, either before this war or after World War II, so it is quite unclear how Djapic could have done anything like that.

It is clear, however, to both Herceg-Bosna Defense Minister Soljic and the Political Administration and to the residents of Herzegovina, especially the residents of Siroki Brijeg, what is going on. The group that has gathered around an individual identified as a criminal by German authorities (Tuta Naletilic) has taken justice and the law into its own hands. It was not only the one that carried out the order to execute Blazo Kraljevic and his escort; the group also recently started a war between the Siroki Brijeg and Ljubuska municipalities by kidnapping from the police a soldier who had previously killed a member of Tuta's group in a mutual clash, destroying the Ljubuska, Citluk, and Mostar prison in the process, and, after torturing him in ways that are not appropriate to describe, blew him up with dynamite.

Now they have demonstrated with Djapic what they have been doing for a long time now around Siroki Brijeg and other Herzegovina municipalities where they dare to go—violence. They collect taxes from private entrepreneurs, deal in drugs and weapons, and steal cars, change the documentation, and resell them. Everything good that this unit did in defending Croatian territory from the aggressor has been canceled out by these outbreaks of violence and lawlessness in Siroki Brijeg.

Shame Because of Crime

General Roso himself also faced elimination several times. His life is guarded by his battalion; otherwise the assassination attempts, such as the ones that occured when he decided that, with the new HVO structure, private armies would be destroyed, would be repeated. Roso disbanded Tuta's unit, but its remnants are still active—Djapic is right about that—probably under the protection of some "more powerful" individual in Zagreb.

The story of Herzegovina lawlessness ends here, and the shame of people born in western Herzegovina because of what has happened begins. Until now it had never happened before, even in remote history, that Herzegovinians have been ashamed precisely because of such events and because of the authorities that are either tolerating or are impotent to eliminate those groups. The team that, by tolerating crime and gangs of thieves like that, has turned Herzegovina into a primitive province and has reduced people who previously earned an honest living to poverty or turned them to smuggling and fraud, is responsible for everything that is happening.

As far as Djapic is concerned, his visit to Herzegovina is perhaps one more attempt at political provocation, which the HSP has been fostering so carefully since the beginning of the war in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the

creation of parallel armies and violent terrorist incursions into the building on Starcevic Square in Zagreb to accusations to the international public that the Croatian authorities are allegedly threatening human rights. In that context the visit to Herzegovina also served Djapic for one more attack against the Croatian leadership. On the other hand, it is good that it happened to a political figure, because it will arouse the media and possibly force people from Herzegovina to put an end to those who, by encouraging lawlessness, are persistently weakening the defense of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is as if the same adviser simultaneously sent Djapic to Herzegovina and ordered Tuta's "ex-cons."

Party of Rights Leaves Opposition Bloc

LD2605201694 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] The extreme right-wing Croatian Party of Rights [Hrvatska Stranka Prava] has left the opposition bloc. However, according to its leaders, this does not mean that it will forge an alliance with the ruling party.

Tudjman Receives Silajdzic, Bosnian Croat Leader

LD2705073894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0700 GMT 27 May 94

[Text] Last night, President Tudjman held separate frank talks with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna presidential council. They discussed the talks in Talloires, implementation of the Washington agreement, the set-up of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its confederal relations with the Republic of Croatia. In the talks with Prime Minister Silajdzic, they also touched on President Tudjman's forthcoming visit to Sarajevo.

Valentic, Iranian Envoy Discuss Relations

LD2605204894 Tehran IRNA in English 1935 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] Vienna, May 26, IRNA—Iran's ambassador to Croatia, Mohammad Javad Asayesh, held talks Thursday in the Croatian capital, Zagreb, with Croatian Prime Minister Nikica Valentic, on trilateral Iran-Bosnia-Croatia relations, as well as the Tehran economic agreement reached between the three parties. The two sides expressing their satisfaction with the confederation agreement between the Croats and Muslims said that they would concentrate their efforts aimed at strengthening the agreement.

Valentic thanking Iran for its assistance, said the Croat-Muslim confederation has paved the way for trilateral economic cooperation. Asayesh, voicing support for trilateral economic collaboration, also stressed Tehran's readiness for expansion of relations. Following Valentic's recent visit to Tehran, Iran is to purchase four cargo ships from Croatia. The trade volume between the two countries amounted to around dlrs 30 million in 1993.

Defense Minister Warns of Yugoslav 'Pressure'

LD2705102394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0739 GMT 27 May 94

[Text] Skopje, 27 May (TANJUG)—Media in Skopje report today that Defense Minister Vlado Popovski has said that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is preparing a new scenario of exerting pressure on The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] by encouraging disputes on the border between Serbia and FYROM. Popovski said this in an address yesterday to officers of the FYROM Army.

After the plan to create Serbian regions in Macedonia failed, the idea of the border being a problem is now favored in Serbian circles, although under the Constitutions of both the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the [former Yugoslav] republics were treated as states, Popovski said. Talking to the officers, Minister Popovski denied the worldwide belief that FYROM has become an American aircraft carrier, and that America's military presence on its territory threatens the security of its neighbors.

FRY Military Buildup No Cause For 'Distress'

AU2505211094 Skopje MIC in English 25 May 94

[Unattributed report: Regular Shift at Border Watchtowers"]

[Text] There is no place for distress after the rumors of the alleged concentration of military forces from the Serbian side on the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]-Serbian border, the competent Macedonian sources quoted by Makpres claim.

After warnings by the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] units stationed in the Republic of Macedonia, that an increased movement of military units is noticed on the other side of the Macedonian-Serbian border, the sources, which asked to remain anonymous, said that the fact of the matter is a regular filling of the border watchtowers with additional reserve soldiers. According to the new organization of the military in rump Yugoslavia, which now massively and actively includes reserve officers, the border units are made up of regular and reserve soldiers.

"The increased movement of soldiers along the border objects is owed to the regular replacement of the reserve soldiers," the sources claim, adding that "it is in no way a case of some unusual concentration of armed forces due to military exercises or maneuvers."

Muslim Party Criticizes Head of Parliament

LD2605223994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0830 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] Skopje, 26 May (TANJUG)—The Executive Council of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA—Stranka Demokratske Akcije] in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], also referred to here as "the imported party" or "Izetbegovic's party," issued a statement expressing its indignation at Stojan Andov, the president of the Macedonian parliament. The statement says that Andov "is deliberately trying to deny the existence of a considerable group of citizens who nationally consider themselves Muslim." The SDA has not been invited to take part in the talks that members of the commission of the European Council's parliamentary assembly, who are not Council members, [as received], held with members of ethnic groups in Macedonia in Ohrid on 24 May.

It has been noted several times over the past two or three years in Skopje that the SDA has been trying to turn the Islamic population originally from Serbia, Montenegro, and former Bosnia-Herzegovina—who arrived in Macedonia in the 1950's to facilitate their emigration to Turkey, but have remained in Macedonia because the Turks suspended immigration—into a new national community in Macedonia.

Some Macedonian parties and associations believe that the SDA has recently been trying to turn these Muslim people in Macedonia—with Serbian as their mother tongue—into some kind of a "Bosniak" nationality. Observers in Skopje believe that attempts to affirm the alleged existence of "Bosniaks" are part of the Islamic fundamentalism strategy in the Balkans and elsewhere. Journalists in Skopje noted that during his visit to Skopje in mid-May, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Murat Karayalcin spoke, and certainly not by accident, about the Muslims in former Bosnia-Herzegovina—who speak the Serbian language—as "Bosniaks." Commenting recently on the increasingly frequent insistence that some kind of a "Bosniak culture" exists in Macedonia, Ljubisa Georgijevski, the president of the Forum for the Freedom of Media in Macedonia, said in a TV program that neither "Bosniaks" nor "the Bosniak language" exist.

Federal

Diplomats See 'Positive Developments' in B-H

LD2605140594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1337 GMT 26 May 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, May 26 (TANJUG)—Diplomatic sources in Belgrade on Thursday said the possibility of lifting U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) voiced by Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, and a statement by the Security Council president calling on Bosnia's three warring sides to cease hostilities were positive developments in the quest for a settlement of the Bosnian crisis. The same sources believe the positive developments were triggered by the meeting of the U.S., Russian and E.U. foreign ministers and U.N. representatives in Geneva on May 13.

The participants in the meeting called on the warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina to cease all hostilities and urged a negotiated settlement of the Bosnian war and gradual lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia imposed in late May of 1992. The latest statement by the Security Council president for the first time makes no reference to the Bosnian Serbs alone, but treats all warring sides equally, diplomats in Belgrade said. Furthermore, Butrus-Ghali made the first explicit reference to the lifting of the anti-Yugoslav sanctions, without making it conditional on a final and lasting settlement of the Bosnian crisis, they added.

U.S. President Bill Clinton's statement that Washington's unilateral exemption of Bosnian Muslims from a U.N. embargo on arms deliveries to all of former Yugoslavia would kill the peace process fits perfectly into the latest positive developments. Bearing all that in mind, the impression is that some changes have nevertheless been made in the international community regarding its stands on the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is especially true of Europe, which is obviously in a hurry to close the 'Bosnian file' before the infinitely more dangerous 'Crimean file' has been opened.

The positive developments would first be tested in the French town of Talloires, where the international 'contact group' for Bosnia-Herzegovina on Thursday started a second round of talks with the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats. There are some indications that the talks are progressing fine, which has also been confirmed by Speaker of the Bosnian Serb parliament Momcilo Krajisnik. There are also indications that Bosnian Muslims and Croats are willing to accept an internationally-brokered plan according to which they would get 51 per cent and the republic of Srpska 49 per cent of Bosnia's territory.

The Muslim and Croat representatives first demanded 58 per cent of the territory for their binational federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Military Opens Trade Office in Singapore

94P20779 Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovenian 3 May 1994 p 8

[Article by Ali H. Zerdin: "'Slovenes' From Singapore"]

[Editorial Report] The 3 May issue of the Ljubljana weekly MLADINA publishes a report detailing attempts by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia military to circumvent the UN-imposed arms embargo and economic sanctions. According to the report, the Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement [FDSP], the only Yugoslav Government agency authorized to trade in weapons, set up a subsidiary, FDSP (Asia) PTE Ltd., in Singapore in June 1991 and established "successful trade relations" with the Burmese Government, to which it reportedly sold several Galeb aircraft.

Lim Poh Weng, a Singapore citizen, is the largest investor in and director of the FSDP Singapore subsidiary, MLADINA states, with Yugoslavs Borislav Jurisic, Nikodin Jovanovic, Caslav Jovanovic, and Mustafa Smailovic serving as executive directors. With the exception of Jurisic, the Yugoslavs listed their permanent address as 9 Nemanjina, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, which is the address of the Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement. Citing a report in the December 1989 issue of the Belgrade military journal NARODNA ARMIJA, MLADINA says that Nikodin Jovanovic attained the rank of lieutenant colonel general in the Yugoslav People's Army.

MLADINA states that following the imposition of the UN arms embargo and economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, FDSP (Asia) PTE Ltd. changed its name to Deuteron PTE Ltd. and increased its capital to 200,000 Singapore dollars. Director Lim Poh Weng's share of the investment was 102,000, and the Yugoslav parent company contributed 98,000 Singapore dollars. The firm's registration number remained unchanged. The Yugoslav parent company, however, is now listed as a Slovene enterprise headquartered at the old Belgrade address. The Yugoslav business partners have also reregistered as Slovene citizens, although they still use the same Yugoslav passports and permanent address in Belgrade. They have dropped Mustafa Smailovic, a Muslim, from their staff and added a new "Slovene" member—Jovan Cekovic. MLADINA notes that it had checked the records in Ljubljana and found that none of the business partners has Slovene citizenship.

Bank Governer Notes Decline in Unemployment

AU2605194494 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] Governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia Dragoslav Avramovic has held talks with the businessmen and trade union leaders of the Rakovica commune. Concluding that production could be increased on the basis of consumer loans, he, at the same time, announced their introduction. Dragoslav Avramovic

stressed that it is encouraging that we have noted a drop in unemployment for the first time since the outbreak of the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. He added that the policy of the National Bank of Yugoslavia is determined by the fact that more than half of the capacities in the economy are unexploited, while the reserves in the labor force are also great. Dragoslav Avramovic is of the opinion that company profits should be taxed and not salaries.

Army Completes First Stage of Transformation

LD2605204494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2008 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] Belgrade, May 26—The Yugoslav Army has successfully completed the first stage of its transformation, says Deputy Chief of Staff General Ratomir Milovanovic. Taking part in a panel discussion on the Yugoslav Army's public image, General Milovanovic said that the army had preserved its unity, maintained the necessary level of combat preparedness, consolidated its ranks and dismantled the territorial defense force. He explained that the process of consolidating and transforming the army had been embarked upon despite a exceptionally unfavourable situations in the world and the country's immediate neighbourhood, and an adverse legacy left behind by the old federation.

The chain of command has been streamlined and the efficacy of the command and logistic apparatus enhanced, he said. The chief of the information department of the army's General Staff, Colonel Ljubodrag Stojadinovic, who spoke about the new identity and public image of the Yugoslav Army, said that the new image had been conceived as far back as 1992 and that it envisaged for a new professional organization, equipped with sophisticated equipment, non-political in character and based on the glorious militayy traditions of the Serbian and Montenegrin people.

The assistant defense minister for the military industry, General Savo Pustinja, said ttat the Yugoslav military industry had oastered the technology for the production of more than 400 weapons systems, 30 percent of which had been exported before the United Nations clamped sanctions on Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) in 1992. The sanctions were imposed because of Yugoslavia's alleged involvement in civil war raging in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina and their lifting is being made conditional on an end to the war.

The Yugoslav Army will have changed the insignia on the uniforms by Army day, June 16, which will be observed for the first time this year.

TANJUG Condemns IZVESTIYA Accusations

LD2605180194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1405 GMT 26 May 94

[By Djordje Milosevic]

[Text] Moscow, May 26 (TANJUG)—The Moscow progovernment paper IZVESTIYA has recently showed that the principle 'innocent until proven guilty' does not apply to the Serbs which it holds responsible for the murder of Russian reporters Viktor Nogin and Gennadiy Kurenoy, reported missing near Kostajnica in the Republic of Serb Krajina on September 1, 1991.

IZVESTIYA's reporter Vladimir Mukusev, member of the special parliamentary commission set up to inquire the case, quotes a testimony by 'star witness' Stevo Borojevic as saying that the two reporters were ambushed on the Bosnia-Croatia border and later executed by one Ranko Borojevic on charges of spying for Croatia. The Serbs were thus found guilty of murder of the two reporters on the basis of a single testimony and without any conclusive evidence.

IZVESTIYA's reporting has been strongly criticized by Vladimir Solovev of the Russian Ostankino television who was also on the investigative team. Solovev said in an interview to the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA paper that Mukusev's statements cannot be independently verified. In a series of articles on the situation in former Yugoslavia, IZVESTIYA has always referred to the Serbs as the sole culprits for everything that has gone wrong.

The way the paper has presented speculations as solid facts and the timing of the story only testify to malevolence and an unhidden desire to harm the Serbs. By portraying the Serbs as the arch villains, the paper is actually trying to persuade the Russian public that the Serbs started the war in former Yugoslavia. All this is aimed into justifying Russia's position on anti-Yugoslav sanctions, support for a series of inconsistent solutions detrimental to the Serbs and lack of reaction to another Moslem-Croat onslaught in Bosnia.

IZVESTIYA believes the Russian public should be constantly reminded of the Serb guilt to minimize criticism of Moscow's erroneous policy towards developments in former Yugoslavia, its biasness, double standards and what some analysts describe as total subordination to the west.

Serbia

One Killed, Nine Wounded in Grenade Explosion

LD2705100194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0944 GMT 27 May 94

[Text] Vrnjacka Banja, May 27 (TANJUG)—One person was killed and nine wounded when a hand granade exploded in a bus full of passengers travelling from Krusevac to Vrnjacka Banja in the central part of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia on Thursday night [26 May]. The person suspected of having thrown the granade into the bus was arrested after the incident. Investigation is under way.

Vojvodina

Hungarian Leader Urges Dialogue With Serbs

LD2605221794 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 26 May 94

[Text] The Hungarians of Vojvodina are not satisfied with the stability process. Szilveszter Varga reports:

[Varga] The drafts coming before the Paris stability conference do not meet the demands and the situation of the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina [VMDK], Andras Agoston [VMDK chairman] said in his interview to Hungarian Radio. The VMDK chairman added that the other minorities probably have a similar standpoint. Asked what chances there are for dialogue between Hungary and Yugoslavia, in harmony with the assumption of bilateral relations—which is being urged by the French—Agoston said the following:

[Begin Agoston recording] In view of the fact that the text itself, which is now on the agenda, says that those who want to enter Europe must sign this stability agreement, I hope that the taking up of Hungarian-Serb relations will be possible in this matter as well. A Hungarian-Serb dialogue could evolve between the countries as well.

At the same time, I consider it important to stress here too that we should take part with an appropriate role in this dialogue, since in the course of the discussions it is us that they will be talking about. I think that in the coming period this taking up of contacts, of dialogue, will get under way, both between the Hungarian community and the Serb—or Yugoslav—government, and between the two governments. [end recording]

[Varga] In answer to the same question, Momcilo Grubac, former minister of minority and human rights of the Panic government, replied that discussions between neighboring countries, where bilateral agreements should also be concluded, are useful, but that much more important is the internal political aspect of this issue, in other words, whether dialogue evolves between the powers that be and the minorities, because it depends on this dialogue how great will be the harmony between the neighboring countries.

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